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Stealth Democracy: Authoritarianism and Democratic Deliberation
Abstract
In Stealth Democracy, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse seek to show that much of the American public
desires "stealth democracy"--a democracy run like a business with little deliberation or public input. The
authors maintain that stealth democracy beliefs are largely reasonable preferences, and the public does
not want and would react negatively to a more deliberative democracy. This paper introduces an
opposing "authoritarian stealth democrats thesis" that suggests that stealth democracy beliefs may be
driven by authoritarianism and a variety of related orientations including poor political perspective
taking and low cognitive engagement. These orientations may be ameliorated through democratic
deliberation. Hypotheses are tested with survey and experimental data from deliberations with a RDD
sample of 568 Pittsburgh residents and of 99 Canadian young adults. Using confirmatory factor analysis
and OLS regression with cluster-robust standard errors, the paper finds that authoritarianism and
related orientations strongly explain stealth democracy beliefs among deliberation participants and that
deliberation significantly reduces stealth democracy beliefs and factors behind these beliefs.
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In  their  widely-read  book,  Stealth  Democracy,  John  Hibbing  and  Elizabeth
Theiss-Morse (2002) critique the view that the public should be more involved in
public policy decisionmaking.  Reviewing the literature, they point out that much
of the American public is unknowledgeable about policies and shifts its policy
positions  in  response  to  content-free  counterarguments.   In  response  to  such
findings,  many  good  government  advocates  and  social  scientists  have  urged
efforts to counteract public apathy and ignorance.  Some have recommend efforts
to instill a more deliberative democracy (Barber, 1984; Chambers, 1996; Fishkin
& Laslett, 2003; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996).  In contrast, Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse suggest that the foregoing scholars are pursuing a dangerous illusion.  They
contend the public is not usually interested in policy and has good reasons not to
be.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse suggest the public cares less about particular policies
than the  impeachability  of  the  governmental  processes  that  put  in  place  those
policies.   Much of the public,  they say,  has a preference for a certain type of
"stealth democratic" process—one in which non-self-interested, well-intentioned
elites  implement  a  presumed  broad  public  consensus  on  the  issues  while
minimizing unnecessary internal debate and conflicting input from self-interested
“publics.”  The authors find that 93.5% of respondents in a representative sample
of Americans agree with one or more of three statements describing what they call
"stealth  democracy"  beliefs.   Seventy-six percent  agreed with two or  more  of
these statements.  These are statements that express a desire to end debate and
compromise  and that  favor  government  by  elites.   Hibbing  and Theiss-Morse
present  evidence  that  these  stealth  democracy  beliefs  matter—they  affect
confidence  in  government,  desire  to  reform  the  government,  voting  for  non-
traditional candidates, and compliance with the law.  In short, they matter for the
political system's stability, which is the authors' primary concern.
In addition, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse shape their various findings into a book-
length argument against prescriptions to engage the public more deeply in politics,
particularly deliberative engagement.  Their "stealth democracy" thesis holds that
the public prefers stealth democracy because it has good reason to find politics
uninteresting, dislikes conflict, and believes there is wide consensus on political
goals.  Because of its belief in a consensus, the public interprets disagreement and
conflict  in politics  as evidence that  special  interests  have overtaken the public
interest.  In addition, much of the public has doubts about the ability of ordinary
people  to  handle  the  details  of  governance  and  therefore  prefer  to  delegate
decisions.  The authors maintain that efforts to politically engage such a public is
a  prescription  for  frustration,  distrust,  and,  therefore,  delegitimization  of  the
political system.  They do, however, call for educating the public against the one
feature of stealth democracy beliefs they find concerning—the public's false belief
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in a political consensus.  The authors fear false consensus beliefs create unrealistic
and destabilizing expectations.
The  stealth  democracy  thesis  has  been  well  received.   The  book  received  a
favorable review by political  science luminary Robert Shapiro  (2003).   And it
became widely used in college courses in political science.  The concept has also
come  into  use  outside  academia,  with  8,810  Google  references  to  "stealth
democracy" in a recent search.
If Hibbing and Theiss-Morse have discovered the basic, unalterable preferences of
the public (the kind of preferences in neo-classical economic theory), then elites
have no choice but  to  respect  these preferences.   However,  much depends on
whether the identified preferences for stealth processes are basic and unalterable
or  instead  derivative  and  changeable,  perhaps  by  better  informing  people  and
seeking to make them more reasonable, coherent, and competent as citizens, as
may  be  essential  for  good  government.   In  the  former  scenario,  political
disengagement must simply be accepted, while in the second, seeking to engage
the public may be a necessity.  This paper theorizes that stealth beliefs may in
substantial  part  be  a  manifestation  of  authoritarianism.   Authoritarians  are
characterized  by  a  constellation  of  views  and  tendencies  that  include  low
cognitive  engagement,  inconsistent  views of  political  conflict,  and inability  or
unwillingness to take alternative political perspectives.  Contrary to the Hibbing
and  Theiss-Morse  thesis,  the  authoritarian  stealth  democrats  thesis  suggests
deliberation could be beneficial–ameliorating stealth democracy beliefs by calling
on people to refine their political thinking.
This  paper  will  examine  whether  stealth  democracy  beliefs  are  grounded  in
authoritarian and related views and dispositions and whether political deliberation
helps to ameliorate stealth democracy beliefs and some of the sources of these
beliefs.   This  paper  examines  these  hypotheses  with  data  from  studies  of
democratic  deliberations  involving  568  Pittsburgh  residents  and  99  Canadian
young adults selected by random digit dialing.  The findings are consistent with
the authoritarian stealth democrats thesis, and suggest that efforts to encourage
citizen participation are beneficial, not harmful. 
An Alternative Theory: Authoritarian Stealth Democrats
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse impose an interpretation of reasonableness on stealth
democrats  without  rigorous  evidence.   The  authors'  focus  group  based
interpretations do not involve a rigorous content analysis.  Nothing in the authors’
national survey questions insures that stealth democrats wish to retain oversight of
leaders or delegate complicated and uninteresting policy choices.  Nor do their
analyses  of  their  survey  data  consider  alternative  explanations.   This  paper
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proposes and tests  an alternative interpretation:  that  stealth democracy beliefs
may be driven by authoritarianism.  This hypothesis echoes a long tradition of
research  that  raises  concerns  about  the  democratic  commitment  of  the  public
(McClosky & Brill, 1983; Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Sullivan & Transue, 1999).
Understanding Authoritarianism.
Before presenting a theory of authoritarian stealth democrats, an analysis of what
constitutes authoritarianism is needed.  Decades of research have provided many
and many-layered definitions of authoritarianism, but the core of the concept is a
problematic belief in the need for deference to authority.  Of course, people may
defer to authority for good reasons—namely, they may have reasons to trust the
authority  such as perceived competency and past behavior,  and they may find
themselves needing to delegate decisions.  Authoritarians, however, defer for less
direct and less compelling or at least less liberal democratic reasons.  
In  childhood,  survival  and  flourishing  typically  depend  on  obeying  authority,
often without questioning.  The non-authoritarian view that grants of authority
should be specific and contingent on reasons and rules represents a sophisticated
additional layer of beliefs about authority that need not accompany child-rearing.
People who emerge from childhood with a belief in the need for unquestioning
obedience  to  authority  are  authoritarian.   Such  people  may  develop  various
reasons  for  the  need  for  obedience,  but  the  reasons  may  be  less  direct  and
compelling than the narrow grounds for justified authority described above. 
A  prominent  justification  for  authoritarianism  is  the  view  that  unquestioning
obedience to authority  is somehow crucial  to maintaining the social order and
preventing chaos and great harm.  Authoritarianism in North America is perhaps
most  directly  captured  by the items of the right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)
scale  (Altemeyer,  1981).   This  scale  measures  such  beliefs  as  the  crucial
importance  of  instilling  obedience  and  respect  for  traditional  authorities  in
children and a desire to punish people who seem deviant.  Both of these follow
from a view of authorities as crucial to maintaining the social order and the good
that comes from it.  Deviants must be harshly punished because they bring chaos
and harm to all.
Authoritarianism may take forms other than RWA.  One possible form is social
dominance orientation or SDO (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  SDO is the belief that
society is better off when one or a few groups dominate other groups.  Because
society is better off with one or a few groups in dominance, persons high in SDO
should also demand that dominated groups acquiesce and obey dominating groups
—domination implies obedience.  Obedience extends to the person high in SDO
beliefs when that person faces a group higher on the hierarchy.  SDO justifies a
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belief in the need for obedience to authority likely through a belief in a vicious,
zero-sum  competition  between  social  groups  and  therefore  the  need  for
domination and obedience to avoid chaos.
A third  possible  form of  authoritarian  impulses  is  vertical  collectivism or  VC
(Triandis, 1996).  VC involves a willingness to sacrifice self-interest in favor of
family or social group, in part because of a belief in a duty to do so.  Family or
other social groups command obedience.  Here, obedience is apparently justified
through  a  conceptualization  of  personal  identity  that  sees  personal  desires  as
selfish  and  unimportant  while  elevating  powerholders  in  social  groups  into
authorities that define what is important and meaningful.  This is likely supported
by beliefs in the inefficacy of the self and the naturalness of conflict between self-
interest and society.
While academic acceptance of the authoritarianism concept has fluctuated over
past  decades,  more recent  research is  strongly supportive.   Altemeyer's  (1981)
research on RWA responds nicely to criticisms of psychometric shortcomings and
political  bias  in  Adorno  et  al.'s  (1950) original  research  on  authoritarianism.
Altemeyer and Jost and his colleagues  (Jost, 2006; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, &
Sulloway, 2003) reinvigorated authoritarianism scholarship.
Authoritarianism and Stealth Democrats.
Authoritarians  should be  attracted  to  stealth  democracy  beliefs.   These  beliefs
include  the  view  that  unelected  experts  and  business  people  should  run  the
government and that government would be better without debate or compromise.
Experts and business people are social authorities typically acceptable to right-
wing authoritarians, those high in SDO, and likely those high in VC (deference to
one’s social group implies deference to those groups recognized as authorities by
that  group).   Note  that  the  desire  for  government  by  unelected experts  raises
questions about whether stealth democrats are democratic.  Finally, authoritarians
want an authoritative will  guiding action in any given domain,  not squabbling
elites  who  must  debate  and  compromise.   Squabbling   undermines  the
authoritativeness of the social order.  Also, debate and compromise imply that
authority should be circumscribed by reasons rather than unquestioningly obeyed.
The authoritativeness of the social order and unquestioning obedience are special
concerns for those who subscribe to RWA and SDO, but are also consistent with
VC.
Stealth  democracy  beliefs  and  related  attitudes  may  in  fact  constitute  an
authoritarian theory of  democracy.   Authoritarianism is  fairly  prevalent  in  the
U.S. (see below), which raises the question of how authoritarians reconcile their
beliefs  about  authority  with  living  in  a  democracy.   The  desire  for  a  single
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authoritative voice could be met by a dictator, but might also be satisfied by belief
in  a  false  consensus  in  the  public—a  key  component  of  stealth  democracy
according to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse.  The belief that the public constitutes one
common  will  is  plainly  false,  even  by  casual  observations  of  an  election.
Nevertheless, authoritarians, who already feel quite negatively about those who
are different, could redefine the "real" public to include only "true," like-minded
Americans.  Such a mythic public consensus likely needs to have an interpreter
and agent  in  the form of  a strong leader  facing  few checks and balances  and
consequently little debate or compromise.
Stenner's  (2005) findings  support  a  relationship  between  authoritarianism  and
desire for a monolithic public will.  She presents a number of experimental results
showing that authoritarians are driven by, "…a fundamental and overwhelming
desire to establish and defend some collective order of oneness and sameness." (p.
277)  Stenner implies at one point that stealth democrats may be authoritarians.
One concern is whether there are sufficiently many authoritarians to account for
the many stealth  democrats  Hibbing and Theiss-Morse find.   Stenner’s (2005)
findings suggest there are.  She shows that authoritarianism powerfully explains
intolerance in representative U.S. surveys—accounting for 45% of the variance in
general intolerance (racial, religious, and political) in General Social Survey data
from 1990-2000.  
The  authoritarian  stealth  democrats  interpretation  yields  importantly  different
empirical  predictions  than  the  Hibbing  and  Theiss-Morse  delegating  stealth
democrats  interpretation.   Authoritarian  stealth  democrats  realize  that  the
consensus they attribute to the public depends on who they define as a member of
the "real" public.  Thus, while they may attribute high levels of consensus to "the
public" as an abstraction, they should be concerned about conflict among random
samples of the actual public brought together to discuss a political  issue.  For
authoritarian stealth democrats, both belief in a false abstract consensus and fear
of conflict among actual citizens should help predict stealth democracy beliefs.
This combination would be contradictory under the delegating stealth democrats
interpretation.   In  addition,  for  reasons  elaborated  below,  authoritarian  stealth
democrats  may  give  up  some  of  their  stealth  democratic  and  authoritarian
orientations in the course of citizen deliberations, contrary to Hibbing and Theiss-
Morses's warnings.
Authoritarianism and Its Effects
Research  on  RWA  shows  that  RWA  is  related  to  a  number  of  problematic
tendencies  and orientations.   This  research finds  that  authoritarians  prefer  low
cognitive effort in a wide range of contexts.  A substantial literature, reviewed by
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Jost et al.  (2003), connects RWA to low attributional complexity, high need for
structure,  and  low  openness  to  experience  (Butler,  2000;  Duriez  &  Soenens,
2006).   Low openness to experience involves limited intellectual  curiosity and
introspectiveness.  High RWAs hold beliefs about social and political facts that
were less accurate than those of low RWAs in 13 of 16 facts in one study (Mirels
& Dean, 2006).  RWA interacts with SDO in predicting a false belief in a social
consensus  favoring  racial  stereotypes  (Strube  & Rahimi,  2006).   This  relates
RWA and SDO to poor  socio-political  perspective  taking and false consensus
beliefs.  Authoritarians reminded of their own mortality, which arouses a sense of
threat,  are  more  likely  to  selectively  expose  themselves  to  pro-attitudinal
information on a policy issue and show inhibited attitude change (Lavine, Lodge,
& Freitas, 2005).  In a study that hints at a relation to stealth beliefs, Peterson et
al.  (2002) find that authoritarians are less knowledgeable about and interested in
politics.  Furthermore, the current paper presents evidence that RWA, SDO, and
VC are associated with poor socio-political  perspective  taking and aversion to
conflict.  Recent research, however, raises questions about ideology and cognitive
biases.   Kahan  (2013)  finds  that  both  liberals  and  conservatives  are  equally
subject to motivated reasoning in certain experimental contexts.  This research,
however, does not examine authoritarianism, which is not equivalent to political
ideology.
Consistent authoritarians should have low cognitive engagement and poor socio-
political perspective taking.  People thinking hard about issues potentially threaten
the  social  order  by  replacing  the  proper  authorities  with  their  own reasoning.
Taking the perspective of less mainstream members of society undermines  the
notion  of  a  monolithic,  correct  social  order  and  potentially  takes  the  side  of
'deviants'  or  undeserving  social  groups.   Because  of  such  connections,
authoritarianism may consist in a constellation of related tendencies.
Stealth Democracy and Deliberation
Public  deliberation  should mitigate  authoritarianism-inspired stealth  democracy
and related beliefs.  These effects stem from the implications of the deliberation
context.   A  typical  public  deliberation,  like  the  ones  examined  here,  brings
together a random selection of the public to discuss issues of serious concern in a
setting  that  invokes  the  public,  such  as  a  university  or  the  nation's  capital.
Participants  are  given  detailed  policy  information  and  are  informed  that  their
choices could have real consequences—community leaders and newspapers are
watching.  These circumstances encourage a context with a number of features:
publicness, salience, rationality, and equality.
Discussing an important issue in a highly public forum with potentially real policy
consequences makes participants accountable.   Participants  will likely feel that
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they  must  give  publicly  acceptable  reasons  that  stand  up  to  broad  scrutiny.
Accountability—awareness that  others  will  review reasons given—to unknown
others increases cognitive effort  and reduces certain biases  (Lerner & Tetlock,
1999; Tetlock, 1992). 
Importantly,  engaging  in  such  cognitive  effort  in  a  context  that  encourages
independent  decision  making  should  create  cognitive  dissonance  for
authoritarians,  because  it  places  them  in  the  role  of  an  autonomous  decision
maker.  The public deliberation context encourages independent choices in several
ways.  Accountability plays a role.  Also, social influence should play less of a
role in public deliberation because final choices are confidential and people do not
know each other.  In drawing their own conclusions, participants will be acting as
authorities—contrary  to their  belief  in relying on the judgments  of authorities.
Deliberation  participants  typically  feel  they  have  made  good  decisions.   The
resulting cognitive dissonance may cause authoritarians to question whether the
judgment of authorities is necessarily better.
Public deliberation could also help clarify for participants that reasonable people
hold  a  diversity  of  views and that,  despite  this,  discussion can be  productive.
With such deliberative methods as the National Issues Forums and Deliberative
Polls, it is commonplace for participants to engage in respectful and thoughtful
discussions of the issues as well  as their  differences  (Fishkin & Laslett,  2003;
Price  &  Cappella,  2002).   Participants  reassured  that  deliberation  can  be
productive should be less apt to fear conflict.  Also, if diverse people can come
together  and  productively  make  a  decision,  then  perhaps  rigid  obedience  to
authority is not the only basis for social or personal order.
Hypotheses
The above theoretical  speculations  suggest  that  authoritarian  tendencies  should
help explain stealth democracy beliefs.  Hypothesis Set 1 is: stealth democracy
beliefs  should  be  appreciably  explained  by  RWA,  VC,  and  SDO.   Also,  as
explained above,  Hypothesis Set 2:  both belief in a false consensus and fear of
concrete conflict will help explain stealth democracy beliefs.  Fear of conflict will
be captured with the variable Expect Conflict.
Authoritarianism comes  in  a  constellation  of  related  attitudes,  particularly  low
cognitive  engagement  and  poor  socio-political  perspective  taking.   These
variables  may  have  direct  effects  on  stealth  democracy  beliefs,  even  with
authoritarianism controlled.  For example, wanting experts to decide policy issues
may  be  an  effort  to  avoid  personal  cognitive  engagement.   Also,  thinking
decisions can be made without debate or compromise might result from a failure
to take the perspective of diverse social groups.  
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Cognitive engagement will be measured here with the need for cognition scale or
NFC (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) and the need for structure-order
scale or NFS (Neuberg & Newson, 1993).  Hypothesis Set 3: Stealth democracy
beliefs will be negatively related to NFC and positively related to NFS.  Socio-
political  perspective  taking  will  be  measured  here  in  two  ways:  a  scale  of
political empathy  (M. H. Davis, 1980) and  naive realism  (Ross & Ward, 1996).
Hypothesis  Set  4:  Both  low  political  empathy  and  high  naive  realism  will
strengthen stealth democracy beliefs.
Given the relative strengths of the data presented here, important hypotheses in
this paper are  Hypothesis Set 5: Formal public deliberations, for reasons given
above, will reduce stealth democracy beliefs and some of the inputs into stealth
democracy beliefs such as authoritarian attitudes, expectations of conflict during
deliberation, and low cognitive engagement. 
Study One—The Virtual Agora Project (VAProject)
Method
Participants
Knowledge Networks (KN) conducted the recruitment for this study, named the
Virtual  Agora  Project  or  "VAProject."   Of  a  sample  of  6,935  Pittsburgh  city
residents  (defined  by  zip  code  area)  who  could  be  reached  via  random digit
dialing  (RDD),  22% agreed  to  participate  in  this  research  and  took  a  phone
survey.  Sampling differed from KN's typical methodology on other deliberation
projects in that it did not utilize quota sampling to make demographic statistics
more apparently representative of the population as a whole.  Thus, the sample
represents who would come to deliberations without demographic oversampling.
Because  of  legal  requirements,  deliberations  could  not  be  based  on  quota
sampling were they more widely used instruments of government.  Without quota
sampling, there is less need for concern that those oversampled will be atypical
for their demographic.
Of recruits who agreed to participate, 37% or 568 people showed for the Phase 1
on-campus deliberation.  A modest response rate was expected because recruits
were asked to participate in a series of online deliberations that would take most
participants eight-months to complete and which they could join only by coming
to the initial on-campus, all-day deliberation.  The final participation percentages
are not, however, incomparable to that of many current nationally representative
opinion surveys that depend on survey panels, such as those produced by Pew
Research.  They  are  also  similar  to  that  of  another  substantial  long-term
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deliberation study, Vincent Price's Electronic Dialogue Project at the Annenberg
School of Communication (Price & Cappella, 2002). 
Ultimately,  the  response  rates  here  are  modest.   Comfort  can  be  drawn from
several considerations: good similarity to population demographics (see below),
the fact that the sample represents people who might be expected to participate in
public engagement to influence policy, and the objective of this research which is
partly  experimental  and  focused  on  psychological  processes  that  should  be
universal.
Despite a non-quota based RDD sample and modest response rate, the participants
in this project reasonably matched the Pittsburgh city population.  The sample was
77%  Caucasian  and  18%  African-American,  compared  with  CPS  population
benchmarks for the relevant zip codes of 75% and 20%, respectively.  Fifty-six
percent  of  the  sample  was  female,  compared  with  53%  for  the  population.
Twenty-five percent of the sample was 18-29 years old, 21% 30-44 years old,
39% 45-59, and 15% 60+.  This compares with population values of 26%, 20%,
26%, and 27%.  The young and thirty-somethings are accurately represented, the
elderly  are  underrepresented,  as  might  be  expected,  while  mid-life  adults  are
overrepresented.  Average age, however, is the same as for the population.  The
greatest departure from population values is for education, which, unsurprisingly,
is greater than for the population.  Median education is "Some College" for both
the  sample  and  the  population.   Lower  educational  categories  are
underrepresented,  with  10%  of  the  sample  having  less  than  a  high  school
education and 14% having just a high school education, compared with 16% and
31% for the population.
Phase 2 of the project, the eight-month at-home online deliberations, was intended
to include 410 of the original  568 participants  who were selected to receive a
computer.   Substantial  participant  drop-off occurred by Phase 2 of the project,
with response rates to questionnaires in the early part of Phase 2 dropping to about
230.  Drop-out was perhaps driven in part by participant frustration with software
and hardware problems.  Fortunately, the post-experiment measurement of only
one variable examined here occurred in Phase 2.
Pittsburgh is an ethnically and class diverse community with a city population of
about 335,000 and over one million in surrounding areas at the time of the study.
Neighborhoods range from suburb-like residential areas to areas of urban poverty.
People  intimately  involved with public  life  in  the  city  believe  that  the  city  is
average in terms of political involvement and contentious public dialogue.  The
topic  of  the  research  was  selected  because  of  its  interest  to  community
organizations, who helped provide the information materials for the project.
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Materials and Procedures
Knowledge  Networks  obtained  phone  numbers  for  households  in  the  City  of
Pittsburgh from a RDD sample.  Where numbers appeared in a reverse directory,
the  household  was  sent  an  advance  letter  on  Carnegie  Mellon  University
stationery.  A Knowledge Networks phone center called households in the RDD
sample  and requested  the  household  member  with  the  most  recent  birth  date.
Both the letter and the call center indicated that in exchange for participation in
the  study,  participants  would  have  a  four  out  of  five  chance  of  receiving  a
Windows  computer  and  eight  months  of  ISP  service.   The  remainder  would
receive $100.  Those who received a computer would be expected to participate in
a  longer-term  online  deliberation  from home  that  would  require  six  hours  of
discussion over eight months.  People who agreed to participate were scheduled
for  a  one-day,  eight  hour  on-campus  deliberation.   Participants  were  asked to
come to a randomly-chosen day from a three week span. 
 
Deliberations were held with up to 60 participants daily.  After informed consent
and a brief training session, participants took a web-based pre-survey.  Next, they
were given a 40 minute  "library session" to  learn  more  about  the  four  policy
topics, a break, 90 minutes for "deliberation" (face-to-face, online, or individual
contemplation, depending on condition), and lunch.  The library session and so
forth were repeated in the afternoon, and this was followed by the second survey.
One experimental condition involved either receiving or not receiving reminders
of citizenship.  In the citizenship condition, participants were reminded to think as
citizens, their rooms had an American flag, and they were given name tags with
American flags and their names preceded by "Citizen."
Measures
The  independent  variables  were  each  measured  with  multiple  questions.   A
question for Conflict Averse (Phase 1 post-deliberation survey), measured on a 7-
point  Likert  scale,  was: "When people  argue about  politics,  I  feel  uneasy and
uncomfortable."  This wording is a minimal rewrite of the Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse question so it would fit better into a set of Likert questions.  It was joined
by a companion reversed question.
The  questions  for  false  consensus  beliefs  occurred  in  the  pre-deliberation
questionnaire.   False Consensus—"Thinking about  the  American  people,  what
portion  of  Americans  do  you  believe  think  <MostImpProblem>  is  the  single
biggest problem facing the country today?" and "What portion of Americans do
you  believe  basically  agree  with  you  on  what  should  be  done  about
<MostImpProblem>?".  The survey system replaced <MostImpProblem> with the
most important problem facing America that the participant had earlier identified.
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The zero to 10 response scale had labels: No Americans, Half of All Americans,
All  Americans.   Another  pre-deliberation  measure  of  expected  unproductive
conflict  was:  Expect  Conflict—"Overall,  what  portion  of  discussion  in  your
discussion group do you anticipate will involve unproductive conflict?" (11-pt.
scale  anchors:  None  of  the  Discussion  /  Half  of  the  Discussion  /  All  of  the
Discussion).
Most  authority  attitudes  and cognitive  dispositions  were measured  using  short
versions  (4-6  items)  of  scales  widely  used  and  accepted  by  political  and
personality  psychologists.   This  includes  social  dominance  orientation,  SDO
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999); right-wing authoritarianism, RWA (Altemeyer, 1981,
1996);  vertical  collectivism,  VC  (Triandis,  1996);  need  for  cognition,  NFC
(Cacioppo et al., 1996); and need for structure-order, NFS (Neuberg & Newson,
1993).  One novel measure is naive realism, the idea for which was suggested by
Ross and Ward  (1996).  It  involves such questions as:  "I can understand why
people who disagree with me politically believe what they believe." and "People
who disagree with me politically seem to have an agenda."  The second novel
measure  is  political  empathy.   The  measure  involved  rewriting  Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (IRI) perspective taking questions (M. Davis, 1996) so that they
focused on politically-relevant rather than interpersonal perspective taking.  These
include questions such as: "If I'm sure I'm right about a political issue, I don't
waste much time listening to other people's arguments."
Results
Factor Analyses
The surveys conducted for this Virtual Agora Project contain multiple questions
for  each  of  several  conceptual  factors,  including  the  novel  scales  of  political
empathy and naive realism.  This raises the issue of whether the questions that
presumably tap a unique latent factor in fact each tap this factor and this factor
alone.  Another matter is whether the factors are all different from each other.
Confirmatory factor analyses were conducted to address these issues, and provide
evidence  for  the  validity  of  the  question  scales.   More  details  of  these  factor
analyses,  which  help  verify  the  scales  used,  can  be  found  in  Appendix  A.
Interpretation utilized the Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), the Adjusted Goodness of
Fit Index (AGFI), the Root Mean Squared Error of the Approximation (RMSEA),
the  Bayes  Information  Criteria  (BIC),  Hoelter's  N,  and  z-scores  of  loadings.
Analyses were conducted in R with the sem package.
A single  factor  explanation  of  stealth  beliefs  does  not  adequately  fit  the  data
(RMSEA=.138 Confidence Interval .09 to .19; BIC=8.14; Hoelter’s N=144), as
elaborated in Appendix A.  Hibbing and Theiss-Morse appear to simply assume
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the unidimensionality of stealth beliefs.  A two-factor model, however, fits the
data (RMSEA=.057 CI 0 to .14; BIC=-4.86; Hoelter's=759).  One factor captures
a  dislike  of  discussion  and  compromise  (henceforth  "stealth  beliefs  #1—no
debate"), and the other captures a belief that elites should rule (henceforth "stealth
beliefs #2—elite rule").  The correlation of these two factors is .68.  Because of
the moderately high correlation,  the two components of stealth beliefs may be
variations  of  a  common  second-order  factor.   The  two  dimensions  can  be
collapsed where their impact on other variables is not substantially different.  
One  confirmatory  analysis  conducted  entertained  the  possibility  that  a  single,
underlying second-order factor, the "authoritarian constellation factor," explains
all the observed covariances between RWA, VC, SDO, political empathy, NFC,
NFS, and false consensus beliefs.  This is not meant to suggest that these variables
all measure the same factor.  Rather, it suggests that there is some single factor,
some  underlying  commonality  of  authoritarianism,  behind  the  covariations of
these factors.  Indeed, this model fits the data quite well (RMSEA=.046;  BIC= -
6327.90; and Hoelter's N=274; GFI and AGFI are .86 and .84, but this is likely
due to the large number of variables under consideration).  BIC gives the model a
strong vote of confidence, indicating that it is far more likely to be the correct
model than a model in which there was no second-order factor and instead each
factor is allowed to covary directly with every other.  These calculations along
with  all  other  Bayes  factors  calculations  in  this  paper  were  conducted  using
equation 20 in Raftery (1995).  
The second-order factor that explains all these authoritarianism-related factors is
appreciably captured by the RWA factor, which has a correlation of .90 with the
second-order  factor.   This  indicates  that  RWA  comes  close  to  capturing  the
unifying factor that explains the covariances between low cognitive engagement,
poor political perspective taking, and other measures of authoritarian tendencies.  
For  subsequent  analyses,  observed  variables  were  combined  into  scales  to
measure the first-order factors identified.  Variables were averaged to create the
scales, with the averages weighted by estimates of each variable's contribution to
each factor, as determined via factor scores regressions.
In  summary,  confirmatory  factor  analyses  show  that  the  “authoritarian
constellation” scales of interest here (RWA, VC, SDO, empathy, NFS, NFS, and
false consensus) have variables that load on the factor defined by each scale and
only that factor—helping to establish the validity of these scales.  Also, a single
second-order “authoritarian constellation factor” explains the covariations among
all  these  first  order  factors,  suggesting  it  may  be  worthwhile  to  examine  the
combination of all the scales.  In addition, confirmatory analyses show that stealth
democracy  beliefs  are  best  explained  by  two  moderately  strongly  correlated
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factors.  The variables can be collapsed into a single scale where findings do not
differ appreciably with a single or two factors.
Convergent and Divergent Validity
Correlations between the scales formed from weighted averages of the variables
were examined to determine convergent and divergent validity of the scales (for
details, see Appendix A).  The "authoritarian constellation" scale variable always
has  highly  significant  relationships  with  all  the  other  scale  variables,  in  the
expected  direction.   Between  the  remaining  first-order  variables  there  are  91
correlations, 80% are significant and in the expected direction.  An additional 8%
are  in  the  expected  direction  and  show a  statistical  trend.   Of  the  remaining
correlations, only two are significant and in an unexpected direction.  These are
the  correlations  between  Vertical  Collectivism  and  two  subscales  of  Political
Empathy, which are significantly positive.  Though not in the expected direction,
these relationships make sense—people who wish to fulfill duties to their group
(VC) may need to be high in political empathy, at least with respect to their group.
The actual  cross-group sensitivity  of  duty-oriented  vertical  collectivists  can be
questioned  given  that  they  are  significantly  more  likely  to  believe  in  a  false
consensus, have a strong need for structure, and have low need for cognition.
An examination of a large number of correlations among the variable scales here
reveals strong evidence for the convergent and divergent validity of the scales.
The significance and strength of the preponderance of these correlations and the
strength of at least some correlations for each scale helps establish the reliability
of the scales.
Explaining Stealth Democracy
Table  1 shows regressions of stealth democracy on three models.  For now, in
order  to replicate  the Hibbing and Theiss-Morse results  and simplify findings,
stealth democracy will be analyzed as a single combined indicator rather than split
into its two somewhat different factors.  All analyses are conducted with 'cluster
robust'  errors  that  account  for  possible  error  covariance  among  people  who
deliberate in the same group.  The model in the first column after the variable
names  (henceforth  Column 2)  seeks  to  reproduce Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's
regression,  with  one  difference.   Hibbing  and  Theiss-Morse  create  a  single
indicator called "negative view of disagreement" that averages false perceptions
of a public consensus, aversion to conflict, and political interest.  Averaging these
questions  runs  contrary  to  the  authors'  theoretical  discussion  and  obscures
important differences in the effects of the variables.  The analysis here separates
these variables.  Column 2 shows that political (dis)interest plays no significant
role  in  explaining  stealth  democracy  beliefs  in  the  current  study,  while  false  
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Table 1. OLS Regressions of Stealth Democracy on Three Models
Independent
Variables
All non-dichotomous variables on 7-point scales.
Unstandardized Coefficients (Cluster-Robust s.e.)
Authoritar.
Constellation
.46***(.06)
Vertical
Collectivism
.20*** (.05)
Right Wing
Authoritar.
.16** (.06)
Social
Dominance
Orient.
.03 (.05)
False
Consensus
.22***(.05) .17***(.04)
Expect
Conflict
.13*** (.04)
Naïve
Realism
.16*** (.05)
Political
Empathy
-.02 (.06)
Need for
Cognition
-.01 (.06)
Need for
Structure
-.02 (.05)
Conflict
Aversion
.09** (.03) .05† (.03) .03 (.03)
Political
Interest
-.04 (.04) -.03 (.04) .03 (.04)
Liberal -.12*** (.04) -.02 (.04) -.04 (.04)
Democrat -.18 (.11) -.18† (.11) -.18† (.10)
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Republican -.06 (.18) -.18 (.17) -.15 (.18)
Education -.28*** (.04) -.20*** (.05) -.18***(.05)
Analyses control for income, race, gender, age, constant
R2; s.e.; N .25; 1.11; 558 .34; 1.04; 555 .30; 1.07; 555
Note: All F-values<.0001.  *** is p<.001; ** is p<.01; * is p<.05; † is p<.10 All p-
values  are  robust  and account  for  non-independence by discussion  group.   P-
values reported are one-sided for all non-demographic variables with coefficients
in the expected direction.
consensus  perceptions  have  2.4  times  the  effect  of  aversion  to  conflict.
Continuous variables were put on seven-point scales to insure comparability of
coefficients.  With addition of yet other control variables in Column 3, conflict
aversion proves non-significant, suggesting that it may have merely a spurious or
indirect relationship with stealth democracy beliefs.  Despite their central role in
the  stealth  democracy  thesis,  personal  discomfort  with  conflict  and  political
disinterest  are not  important  factors  in  explaining  stealth  democracy beliefs  in
these  data.   Note,  however,  that  the  data  here  replicate the  key  Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse result—when all three variables are averaged into a "negative view
of disagreement" variable, that variable strongly and significantly predicts stealth
beliefs.
Column 3 of Table 1 displays the full model derived from the authoritarian stealth
democrats thesis, along with the Hibbing and Theiss-Morse model.  The Column
3 model is superior to the Column 2 model in terms of R2 and standard error.  The
only variable from the Hibbing and Theiss-Morse theoretical model that remains
significant in Column 3 is false consensus beliefs.  The most potent variable in
Table 1 is VC with RWA a closesecond.  As predicted by the authoritarian stealth
democrats  thesis,  both false  beliefs  in  a  public  consensus  and expectations  of
unproductive conflict in the actual deliberations contribute to stealth democracy
beliefs.  This poses a paradox for the stealth democracy thesis.  Naïve realism also
proves  to  have  a  significant  direct  effect,  though  political  empathy  and  the
cognitive  variables  do  not.   Nevertheless,  these  variables  significantly  affect
stealth  democracy  in  bivariate  correlations,  which  may  mean  their  effects  are
perhaps mediated by other variables.
 
Column 4 of Table 1 tests the possibility that a single composite indicator of the
"authoritarian  constellation"  might  do  well  in  explaining  stealth  democracy
beliefs.  The composite quite potently explains stealth democracy beliefs, with a
coefficient 2.5 times more powerful than any coefficient in Column 3.  While the
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amount of explained variance is lower than for Column 3, this may be due to less
overfitting.  A Bayes factors analysis indicates that the Column 4 model is about
4,000 times more probable than the full model in Column 3, supporting the view
that  there  is  an  underlying  "authoritarian  constellation"  that  explains  stealth
democracy  beliefs.   Bayes  factors,  however,  tends  to  favor  simple  models.
The analyses here replicate the Hibbing and Theiss-Morse finding that a single
"negative  view  of  disagreement"  variable  strongly  and  significantly  predicts
stealth beliefs—showing that the population under study here is not different in
this respect from the population studied by the authors.  However, when the three
variables constituting  negative view of disagreement are regressed separately, an
analysis Hibbing and Theiss-Morse do not present, one of the variables (political
interest) proves insignificant and another (conflict aversion) of marginal strength
—despite the fact that all three are important in the authors’ theory.  When the
authoritarian  constellation  variables  are  added  to  the  regression,  only  false
consensus beliefs proves significant.  This variable is important in both the stealth
democracy  and  the  authoritarian  stealth  democrats  theses.   In  addition,  both
expectations of conflict in a real discussion and false belief in a public consensus
on policy issues prove significant and positive.  This is paradoxical in the stealth
democracy  hypothesis,  but  is  explained  by the  authoritarian  stealth  democrats
hypothesis.   The  authoritarian  stealth  democracy  model  proves  to  appreciably
better  explain  stealth  democracy  beliefs,  with  authoritarian  attitudes  and
authoritarian-related orientations playing substantial roles.  A model with a single
authoritarian constellation scale, combining all the variables in the authoritarian
stealth democrats hypothesis, does well.
Explaining the Different Types of Stealth Beliefs
Stealth  beliefs  are  more  accurately  construed  as  two separate  though strongly
related factors.  Separate analyses (not depicted) for each form of stealth beliefs
do yield differing results.  For the No Debate component of stealth beliefs, results
are quite similar to the undifferentiated stealth model in column 3 of Table  1.
This is the component that will prove to be affected by deliberation.  For the Elite
Rule component of stealth beliefs, SDO unsurprisingly becomes more important
and  RWA  becomes  insignificant.   VC  remains  highly  significant  with  a
coefficient  of  .16.   For  the Elite  Rule model,  expectations  of  conflict  play an
appreciably  bigger  role,  perhaps  because  fear  of  actual  conflict  enhances  the
perceived need for elites. 
Effects of Deliberation on Stealth Democracy Beliefs and Related Variables
Table  2 presents  results  indicating  that  deliberation  helps  ameliorate  stealth
democracy beliefs and some of the variables feeding into these beliefs.  Only two
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of the nine variables underlying the authoritarian stealth democrats thesis were
available  for  consideration  with  immediately  post-deliberation  measures.   A
decision  was  made  to  not  include  comprehensive  pre-  and  post-  deliberation
measures in Phase 1 of the study, with the expectation they would be included in
Phase  2—a  series  of  follow-up  surveys.   Regrettably,  Phase  2  experienced
considerable and growing respondent drop-out and began later than desired.  The
first follow-up survey in Phase 2 fortunately contained a post-measure for stealth
democracy beliefs, for which there was no immediate post-discussion measure.
Other relevant questions appeared on later Phase 2 surveys, but with even more
respondent  attrition  and  at  a  greater  time  remove  from  the  intervention.
Therefore, only the crucial stealth democracy beliefs variable between Phases 1
and 2 will be considered.  In short, all the variables analyzed in Tables 1 and 2,
with  one exception,  were  collected  during  the  one day deliberation.  Only  the
stealth democracy beliefs variable was collected in Phase 2.  Table 2 includes
controls  for  discussion  media  (f2f,  online,  or  no  discussion)  and  citizenship
reminders, a 3X2 experiment built into this study, as described in the Materials
and Procedures section above.  These conditions are not the focus here, but they
must be statistically addressed.
Table 2. OLS Regressions Showing Effects of Deliberation on Outcome
Variables
Dependent Variables
VC (post-
deliberation,
between group)
Change in Expect
Conflict
Change in Stealth
#1: No Debate
Independent
Variables
All non-dichotomous variables are on 7-pt scales.
Unstandardized Coef. (Cluster-Robust s.e.)
Online -.32** (.11) -.90** (.32) -.37* (.18)
F2F -.01 (.15) -.82* (.41) -.26 (.22)
Cit. Reminders -.20 (.14) -.09 (.32) -.21 (.30)
Online X Citiz .19 (.18) .58 (.61) .46 (.48)
F2F X Citizen -.27 (.22) .45 (.56) .09 (.41)
Education -.14***(.03) .12 (.09) .09 (.07)
Income .05 (.04) -.15† (.08) -.03 (.07)
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Age .10* (.04) -.28** (.10) .05 (.07)
African-Amer. .10 (.11) .82** (.29) -.18 (.25)
Male .22* (.09) .23 (.18) -.18 (.25)
Constant .73***(.17) -.32 (.47) -.37 (.29)
N; R2; s.e. 556; .08; 1.0 559; .22; 2.4 230; .04; 1.3
Note: All F-values<.0001.  *** is p<.001; ** is p<.01; * is p<.05; † is p<.10 All p-
values are robust and account for non-independence of errors by discussion group.
P-values reported are two-sided.
One of the nine authoritarian stealth democrat related variables was collected only
post-discussion in Phase 1: vertical collectivism (VC).  Column 2 of Table 2 (the
first column of results) shows an ANOVA-equivalent regression with a between-
groups comparison.  The constant is the mean for VC in the excluded condition:
the  control  condition  with  no  discussion  and  no  reminders  of  citizenship.
Coefficients for the other conditions indicate deviation from the constant, which
captures  the control  condition.   Thus,  for example,  the mean level  for  Online
is .73-.32 or  .41.  Column 2 shows that online discussion significantly lowers
levels of post-discussion VC relative to the control condition.   A post-hoc test
reveals that VC is also significantly reduced in the online discussion with citizen
reminders  condition  (p=.009).   Thus,  online  deliberation  reduces  vertical
collectivism, which is a major contributor to stealth democracy beliefs.
Pre-deliberation  expectations  of  unproductive  conflict  can be compared with a
post-deliberation  Phase  1  measure  of  perceptions  of  actual  conflict  during
discussion, a within-subject comparison.  Column 3 of Table 2 shows a regression
of the  change in  perceived conflict  (post-deliberation  perceived conflict  minus
pre-deliberation  expected conflict) on the experimental conditions.  Coefficients
of  the  experimental  conditions  indicate  the  amount  by  which  each  condition
reduces  post-deliberation  perceived  conflict  from  pre-deliberation  expected
conflict, relative to the excluded control condition (no deliberation and no citizen
reminders).  Changes are quite substantial and negative, indicating large declines
in perceived conflict, with significant effects for both online and f2f deliberation.
Column 4 of Table 2 shows significant reductions in the No Debate component of
stealth democracy beliefs in the online deliberation condition.   A post-hoc test
also shows a significant effect for the f2f X citizen condition (p=.04, one-sided).
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No effects were found for the Elite Rule component.  This may be because few
people agreed with Elite Rule to begin with—only 27% saw elite rule as desirable.
In short, the data allow analysis of change from pre- to post-deliberation for three
of  the  authoritarian  constellation  variables.   Online  deliberation  significantly
reduces  VC.   Both  online  and  face-to-face  deliberation  substantially  reduce
expectations  of  conflict.   VC and expectations  of  conflict  appreciably  explain
stealth democracy beliefs, as Table 1 shows.  Finally, online deliberation and f2f
deliberation with citizenship reminders both significantly reduce the No Debate
component  of stealth  democracy beliefs measured months after  the discussion.
The Elite Rule component may show no significant effects because of a ‘floor’
effect—low initial levels of agreement with this component.
Discussion Study One
Leaving most discussion to the conclusion, this post-study discussion will focus
on  some  peculiarities  of  the  current  study.   Deliberation  in  the  current  study
affects only the "no debate or compromise" component of stealth beliefs.  This is
unsurprising  given  that  the  value  of  debate  and  compromise  are  directly
implicated  by  the  deliberation  experience.   In  contrast,  the  value  of  business
leaders and experts in government are not.  There may also be a ‘floor’ effect that
prevents registering any significant decrease.  
An interesting finding with respect to the ameliorative effects of deliberation is
that online deliberation reduces all three stealth and stealth-related attitudes tested,
while  face-to-face  deliberation  directly  affects  only  perceptions  of  conflict
(though the f2f  X citizenship  reminders  condition  significantly  reduces  stealth
beliefs  as  well).   Perhaps,  as  the  social  identity  and  deindividuation  model
suggests (Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 1998), the absence of social cues in an online
setting can give rise to an individualistic orientation.  Such an orientation might
contribute  toward  reducing  authoritarian  reasoning.   This  would  explain  why
online discussion has a significant effect on vertical collectivism and on stealth
beliefs in the VAProject findings.  On the other hand, the CPRN findings below
show that  face-to-face deliberations  lasting a few days can also reduce stealth
beliefs in the short run, without special reminders of citizenship.
Study Two—Canadian Policy Research Networks (CPRN)
While the Virtual Agora Project data (Study 1) has the virtue of a broad depth of
variables,  its  modest  response  rate  and  one-city  focus  raise  the  question  of
whether findings from that study would replicate in a broader population.  Study
2, the CPRN Inc. National Dialogue and Summit on Engaging Young Canadians,
involves a deliberation drawn from a nationally representative sample of Canada
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with a good response rate.   The study, however,  has a more limited  scope of
available variables.
Method
Participants
EKOS Research Associates,  a  polling firm,  conducted  the recruitment  for this
CPRN study.  Two-hundred and fifty-five young Canadian adults were selected
using RDD.  Some of these 255 did not meet demographic criteria (age, gender,
education,  ethnicity,  and language),  while others declined to participate.   One-
hundred and seventy-eight participants who met the demographic criteria and did
not  immediately  decline  to  participate  where  invited  to  participate  in  this
nationwide  deliberation.   The  number  who  immediately  declined  was  not
recorded.  One hundred and forty-four actually came to the deliberation.  Of these
144,  99  completed  both  the  pre-  and  post-surveys  of  this  study,  which  were
piggybacked onto this deliberation.  The true response rate, depending on whether
the  178 or  255 base figure is  used,  is  between 39% and 56%–an appreciable
percentage of the sample by both standard survey and deliberative standards. 
The targeted participant population was Canadian young adults, ages 18-25.  The
sample  of  99  participants  who  took  the  research  surveys  differ  hardly  at  all
demographically  from the 144 participants  in the event.   Time constraints  and
mistakes with respondent identifiers account for the lack of full survey completion
by 45 participants.  The research survey participants' education levels were: 5%
some high school, 24% high school graduates, 37% some college or university,
11% community / CEGEP / private college (technical schools), 18% Bachelors,
and 5.6% graduate degrees.   By comparison,  Statistics  Canada's  Labour Force
Survey for the previous year showed educational levels for  young adults 20-24 of
12%  some  high  school,  24%  high  school  graduates,  28%  some  college  /
university, 24% community / CEGEP / private college, 11% Bachelors, and 1%
graduate degrees.  The study participants are somewhat better educated than the
general public, but do represent all educational levels.  
Gender was 54% female, compared with 50% for the 18-25 age group (Statistics
Canada,  prior census).   Ten percent  of the sample  was visible  minorities,  3%
aboriginal,  and 2% disability.   This  compares  with 16%, 4%, and 4% for  the
population (Statistics Canada, prior census, 15-24 age group).  Seventeen percent
of the sample was Francophone, compared with 22% for the population (Statistics
Canada, census, 15-24 age group).  Overall, the sample is similar to the Canadian
population for approximately this age cohort, though somewhat more educated.
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Materials and Procedures
Those  invited  were  offered  an  expenses-paid  three  night  stay  in  Ottawa  (the
capital of Canada), travel included, but no other compensation.  All participants
arrived on a given Thurs., began their day Friday with questionnaires, including
the questionnaire for this study, deliberated about the "future of Canada" Friday,
Saturday,  and  part  of  Sunday,  and  were  asked  to  do  post-discussion
questionnaires,  including  for  this  study,  before  leaving  on  Sunday.   Time
constraints  limited  the  pre-  and  post-discussion  research  surveys  each  to  ten
minutes.   Forty  community,  public  and  private  sector  leaders  helped  brief
participants and answered questions.  Participants were divided, initially, into four
groups, each of which received briefings and held discussions on the topics of
education,  work,  health,  and the  environment,  respectively.   Each of  the  four
groups were further divided into four groups of about 10 persons each for more
detailed discussions.  Participants were encouraged to cross group boundaries to
learn about other issues, and many did.
Measures
Measures  are  modeled  after  those  in  the  Virtual  Agora  Project  (VAProject),
though, because of the limited survey space and differing aims of the study, fewer
scales were given and fewer items were given for some scales.  The pre- and post-
discussion design means that the same questions were asked both before and after
discussion.   False  Consensus,  expectations  of  unproductive  conflict,  political
interest, and demographics are measured as in the VAProject (see above).  Of the
main authoritarianism measures, only RWA was collected.  It was measured with
two items, rather than the four items in the VAProject.  Of the stealth beliefs, only
the two items of the stealth beliefs #1 factor, no debate, were included, because
these items changed mean value in response to the VAProject deliberation.
Results
Factor Analyses
Both the pre- and post-discussion questions can be analyzed together, as separate
estimates  of  the  underlying  factor—provided  that  the  covariance  relationships
among variables remains the same both before and after.  In addition, weighted
average  variables  that  include  both  pre-  and  post-discussion  questions  can  be
included in regression analyses, provided the covariance relationships remain the
same.   Testing,  using  cordif  in  R,  indicates  no  significant  differences  among
covariances or correlations from pre- to post-discussion.  One other concern is
missing data, which is inevitable with paper surveys.  Only 1.4% of data values
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were missing.  These were filled in with the R package "mice," using Bayesian
imputation methods.
A  confirmatory  analysis  for  the  variables  making  up  scales  for  RWA,  false
consensus  beliefs,  and stealth  democracy beliefs  overall  support  the  stipulated
model.
Explaining Stealth Democracy
Before  examining  regressions,  a  prior  issue  is  whether  robust  standard  errors
should be used in analyzing the CPRN data, given that participants were split into
two groups and encouraged to meet with other groups.  This suggests that groups
may not matter much, a proposition that can be examined with multi-level models
that allow groupings and nested groupings. Replicating the regression in Table 3,
Column 2, no evidence was found for cluster error covaration.   Consequently,
cluster-robust standard errors will not be used.
Table 3, Column 2 shows a partial replication of the analysis in Table 1, Column
3, with the current data.  The replication is partial because only the RWA scale, of
the  main  authoritarianism  scales,  was  available  in  the  current  study.   As  the
discussion will clarify, the RWA scale and its relationship with stealth beliefs is
centrally  important.   Table  3,  Column  2  indicates  that  both  RWA  and  false
consensus beliefs significantly increase stealth democracy beliefs, while education
significantly  decreases  these beliefs,  consistent  with Table  1.   Expectations  of
unproductive conflict have no effect on stealth beliefs.  Column 3, for comparison
purposes,  shows  an  analysis  of  the  same  limited  set  of  variables  using  the
VAProject  data.   Importantly,  there  is  no  significant  difference  between  the
coefficients  of  RWA for  the  Column 2  and Column 3  models  (bias-corrected
accelerated, BCa, bootstrapped confidence intervals for the difference of the two
coefficients  indicates  a  p-value  above  .20,  N=10,000 for  bootstrapping).   The
difference of the education coefficients is also non-significant (BCa p>.15).  The
effects of false consensus beliefs is clearly indistinguishable between the models.
Effect of Deliberation on Stealth Democracy Beliefs
A t-test of the difference between stealth democracy beliefs measured from pre-
and post-discussion finds a highly significant decrease in stealth beliefs (-.21, t=-
3.33,  p=.0006  one-sided).   Because  the  before  and  after  differences  were
measured within individual, it is unnecessary to control for other variables that
remain constant within individual, such as demographics or stable attitudes.
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Table 3. OLS Regressions of Stealth Democracy on CPRN Data and
Comparison with Similar Model from Virtual Agora Project Data
Independent Variables
All non-dichot. vars on 7-pt scales.
Unstandardized Coef. (s.e.)
CPRN Data VAProject Data (Cluster
Robust)
RWA .17* (.09) .24*** (.05)
False Consensus .25* (.14) .22*** (.06)
Expect Conflict -.03 (.15) .10** (.04)
Political Interest .17 (.16) .03 (.04)
Education -.60*** (.18) -.32*** (.05)
Income .02 (.08) -.009 (.04)
Age 1.84 (1.32) .05 (.05)
Male -.29 (.31) -.14 (.11)
Minority .30 (.41) .31* (.16)
Constant -.16 (.84) .69* (.31)
R2; s.e.; N .22; 1.44; 99 .28; 1.28; 558
Note: All F-values<.0001.  *** is p<.001; ** is p<.01; * is p<.05; † is p<.10 All p-
values are robust and account for non-independence by discussion group.  P-
values reported are one-sided for all non-demographic variables with coefficients 
in the expected direction.
Discussion Study Two
This section presents findings from a nationally representative sample of young
adults with a good response rate, the CPRN study.  With respect to the impact of
RWA and other variables on stealth beliefs, the CPRN and the prior VAProject
studies  could have been drawn from the  same population.   Unfortunately,  the
remaining authoritarianism-related variables could not be included in the CPRN
study due to space limitations.   Nevertheless,  as Study 1 shows, RWA largely
explains  all  the  covariances  among  the  authoritarian  constellation  variables.
Given RWA's centrality and the similar effects of RWA on stealth beliefs in the
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two studies, it is plausible that other authoritarian variables might have influenced
stealth beliefs in the CPRN study.
Expectations of unproductive conflict did not have a significant effect on stealth
beliefs in the CPRN study, though they did in the VAProject.  This may due to the
different  contexts  of  the  study.   The  VAProject,  which  focused  on  a  highly
contentious local issue, could have given rise to different expectations than the
CPRN deliberations, which involved a general discussion of policies affecting the
future of Canada.
Importantly, the CPRN analyses find that participation in the deliberation quite
significantly reduced stealth democracy beliefs from immediately before the two
and a half day deliberation to immediately after.  This replicates the VAProject
finding of significant change in stealth beliefs from before to months after the
deliberation.
General Discussion
The research presented here has both strengths and limitations  with respect  to
what  it  can  reveal  about  deliberation  and  stealth  democracy.   The  first  study
encountered data collection issues, and the second study had limited survey space.
One result is that pre- and post- comparisons to determine whether deliberation
significantly changed variables in the authoritarian stealth democracy model are
limited to a few. Nevertheless,  the data in both studies crucially  establish that
deliberation reduces a component of stealth democracy beliefs—the component
less likely to experience a ‘floor’ effect.  And the first study finds that deliberation
significantly reduces two important inputs of stealth democracy beliefs.  
One  of  the  post-discussion  measures  examined  in  Table  2  (study  1),  stealth
democracy beliefs, was collected several months after the deliberation and after
respondent  attrition.   Nonetheless,  one of the two components  of these stealth
beliefs shows a significant decrease among online deliberators in this long run.
Attrition of respondents raises the concern that only those who remained in the
study showed this reduction.   Then again,  this means that 56% of the original
sample randomly selected to participate in later  months showed the reduction.
Study  2  also  provides  a  reassuring  replication  that  finds  immediate  post-
deliberation reductions in this component of stealth beliefs among participants.
With  the  exception  of  the  stealth  beliefs  variable  in  study  1,  all  others  were
collected immediately pre- and post-deliberation in both studies.   The research
therefore does not establish whether vertical collectivism, expectations of conflict,
or other variables show long-term changes.  However, it may be unrealistic to
expect one deliberation experience to permanently solve social ills.   Regarding
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external  validity,  the  research  here  includes  one  professionally-conducted
deliberation  and  one  deliberation  that  generally  follows  the  Deliberative  Poll
methodology.   The finding of reduced stealth  beliefs  also replicates  in  a  third
dialogue conducted by AmericaSpeaks.  This creates the expectation that findings
would generalize to common deliberation practices.  
A related external validity issue is the capacity to generalize to the broader public.
Because of a relatively low response rate, Study 1 does not generalize well to the
broad population, though it may say something about the more engaged public
that comes to deliberations and that may be of special interest to policymakers.
The likely greater engagement of participants may also mean that the attitudes and
orientations  of  the  general  public  would  not  be  as  consistent  as  found in  the
confirmatory factor analyses here.  Study 2, however, is nationally representative
and has a substantial response rate.  Its findings appear to replicate the results of
Study 1, though more limited in the variables considered.  Overall, more research
is  needed  to  determine  the  full  spectrum  of  authoritarian  stealth  democracy
variables  affected  by deliberation,  the duration  of  the  effects,  and what  might
prolong the effects.
Summary and Conclusion
The authoritarian stealth democrat thesis, which this paper supports, suggests that
stealth  democracy  beliefs  are  driven  by authoritarianism and authoritarianism-
related beliefs that are not basic, unchanging preferences.  Instead, they are both
changeable  and problematic from the point of view of a democratic society.  The
widespread presence of stealth democracy beliefs raises the need for interventions
to engage the public in ways that help that public embrace democracy rather than
expect a non-existent consensus of experts and business people to choose policy.
Findings  here  suggest  that  deliberative  engagement  helps  reduce  stealth
democracy beliefs and the authoritarian inclinations that feed these beliefs.
In contrast, the stealth democracy thesis contends that most of the public has a
basic preference for a democracy with little debate or compromise run by experts
and business people.  Hibbing and Theiss-Morse find the U.S. public generally
agrees with questions tapping these stealth democracy beliefs.  Their findings and
theoretical assumptions lead these authors to conclude that encouraging political
participation,  particularly  in  the  form  of  democratic  deliberation,  would
delegitimize the political system.
This  paper  proposes  an alternative  "authoritarian  stealth  democrats"  thesis.   It
stipulates that stealth democracy beliefs are rooted in a problematic constellation
of authoritarian orientations which may be ameliorated by involving people in
political  deliberation.   The views and dispositions  in this  constellation  include
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false consensus beliefs, fear of conflict, strong pro-authority attitudes, incapacity
for socio-political perspective taking, and dispositions to cognitive lethargy.  
This paper's findings are consistent with the authoritarian stealth democrats thesis.
In Study 1 (Table 1), the authoritarian views and dispositions prove to be a much
better  explanatory model  than Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's  original  model  that
focuses on false consensus beliefs, political disinterest, and aversion to conflict.
Indeed, the latter  two variables prove non-significant,  challenging Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse's  interpretation  of  stealth  democracy  beliefs  as  rooted  in
understandable political disinterest and aversion to conflict. Authoritarian beliefs,
associated  in  the  literature  with  low  cognitive  engagement,  intolerance,  and
punitive attitudes, are the most potent explanation of stealth democracy beliefs.
Also,  the  Hibbing  and  Theiss-Morse  interpretation  does  not  explain  why
participants in the VAProject embraced stealth democracy both out of a belief that
the public agrees on all the important issues and a fear of conflict in actual public
discussions.   The  authoritarian  stealth  democrats  thesis  explains  how  this  is
possible. 
The data here come from people who chose to participate in deliberations, which
raises questions about how well findings generalize to the population.  If there
were any direct conflict between Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's survey findings and
the Study 1 findings, then those authors' nationally representative dataset would
be more persuasive.  There is, however, no conflict of findings.  The data for this
paper replicates the key Hibbing and Theiss-Morse finding that a single "negative
view of disagreement" variable,  combining false consensus beliefs,  aversion to
conflict,  and  low  political  interest,  strongly  explains  stealth  beliefs.   This
replication suggests study participants are not atypical with respect to the stealth
democracy thesis.  Where the current paper departs from the authors' findings is in
separately analyzing the components of "negative view of disagreement" and in
adding  the  "authoritarian  constellation"  variables,  which  do  better  explaining
stealth beliefs than the authors’ model. 
Also,  the  CPRN  findings  (Table  3)  confirm  that  right-wing  authoritarianism
(RWA)  false  consensus  beliefs,  and  education  affect  stealth  beliefs  to  a
statistically  indistinguishable  degree  from  their  effects  in  the  VAProject  data
(other  variables  were not included due to limited space).   This provides some
support that the findings here may generalize to a broader population, because the
CPRN data  involves  a  nationally-representative  Canadian  RDD sample  with  a
more robust response rate.   The authoritarian stealth  democrats  hypothesis  not
only clarifies why authoritarianism-related variables explain stealth beliefs among
study participants, but also provides an elegant explanation of why deliberation
reduces stealth beliefs and variables influencing these beliefs.
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The Virtual Agora Project findings reveal that democratic deliberation mitigates
two of the key factors behind stealth democracy beliefs, vertical collectivism and
perceptions of conflict, as well as one of the two components of stealth democracy
beliefs (other variables could not be tested with the available data).  Importantly,
the decline in stealth beliefs was found months after the deliberation.  The CPRN
data  strongly  replicate  the  result  that  the  no-debate  component  of  stealth
democracy beliefs declines as a consequence of deliberation.  Data from a third
dialogue  by AmericaSpeaks,  not  analyzed  here,  also shows significant  pre-  to
post- discussion declines in stealth democracy beliefs  (Muhlberger, 2007).  Data
from  four  deliberations,  including  the  VAProject  and  CPRN,  show  that
deliberations  improved  confidence  in  some  governmental  actors  while  not
reducing confidence in others (Muhlberger, 2007).  These findings conflict with
the Hibbing and Theiss-Morse contention that efforts to engage the public may
delegitimize the political system.  Findings in the current paper suggest that, at
least  for people who choose to  attend deliberations  in  the U.S.  and a broader
population sample in Canada, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's concerns for system
stability are incorrect.  
Hibbing  and  Theiss-Morse's  recommendations  for  improving  system  stability
would  likely  not  work  if  the  authoritarian  stealth  democrats  interpretation  is
correct.   Authoritarian  stealth  democrats  would  not  respond  to  the  authors'
proposed  educational  efforts  meant  to  challenge  the  factual  accuracy  of  their
belief in a false consensus.  The theory presented here suggests that authoritarians
embrace a belief in a consensus not because they believe it is accurate but because
they believe it is necessary to have a consensus for democracy to be possible at
all.   They  likely  restrict  who constitutes  the  'real'  public  to  make  belief  in  a
consensus possible.
The  authors'  emphasis  on  system  stability  and  legitimacy  constitute  a  value
commitment  that  can  be  challenged  by  other  values,  such  as  democracy.   If
political  apathy were a  basic,  unchangeable  preference,  then academics  should
give up calls for a more engaged democracy.  The authors have not, however,
proven that preferences for apathy are basic and unchangeable.  The current paper
suggests that the stealth beliefs presumably emerging from apathy are driven by
problematic  authoritarian  orientations,  important  components  of  which  are
ameliorated by democratic deliberation.  
The authoritarian constellation of views and dispositions might be explained by
cognitive  development.   Rosenberg  (1988,  2002) finds  that  adults  reason
differently  about  causality,  with  some  adults  able  to  understand  systems  and
others  only able to understand simple linear  causal relationships.   People who
understand systems are likely to appreciate a government involving a system of
checks and balances, while linear reasoners would have difficulty understanding
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how  social  order  could  be  possible  without  a  powerful  authority  or  public
consensus.  Authoritarianism is correlated with developmental measures of moral
reasoning (Altemeyer, 1981; Boyes & Allen, 1993; McFarland & Mathews, 2005)
and ego development  (Browning,  1987).   Additional  research  on the  potential
developmental basis of authoritarianism would be desirable.    
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APPENDIX A:  CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSES
The  surveys  conducted  for  this  study  contain  multiple  questions  for  each  of
several conceptual factors, including the novel scales of social empathy and naive
realism.   This  raises the issue of whether the questions that  presumably tap a
unique latent factor in fact each tap this factor and this factor alone.   Another
matter  is  whether  the  factors  are  all  different  from each  other.   Confirmatory
factor analyses were conducted to address these issues, providing evidence for the
validity of the question scales.
This dataset presents a challenge for confirmatory factor analysis in that balanced
question  sets  typically  split  into  two  strong  and  separate  factors—one  for
positively worded questions and one for negatively worded questions, even for
such well-known question scales as RWA and SDO.  This outcome is likely the
consequence of participants being asked to answer a lengthy online survey in a
limited  time  period.   In  order  to  remain  consistent  while  rapidly  answering
questions,  participants  appear  to  have  clustered  answers  to  similarly  valenced
questions together.  Coordinating such clustering across negatively and positively
worded  questions  would  be  cognitively  challenging,  so  instead  two  separate
clusters appear to have emerged—one for each type of wording.  Reassuringly,
averaging  questions  across  negative  and  positive  wordings  generally  creates
indicators  that  correlate  better  with  other  variables.   Nevertheless,  standard
confirmatory  factor  analyses  detect  a  meaningless  factor  for  each  question
valence.  To address this problem, an adjustment was made to the confirmatory
model that allows for meaningless clustering of positive and of negative question
wordings.   Negatively  worded  questions  were  allowed  to  load  on  a  negative
wording factor, and similarly for positively worded questions.  The two factors
were given identical variances but not allowed to covary.  This solution worked
well.  The adjusted model is identified.
Individual confirmatory factor analyses were conducted on each of the question
scales to determine if a single factor could adequately explain the proposed set of
questions.  Table I shows the results of these analyses.  A Goodness of Fit Index
(GFI) of .90 and above is considered very good.  It roughly corresponds to an R2
in regression analysis.  An Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) above .80 is
considered acceptable by some, above .90 by others.  Both GFI and AGFI can be
misleading in certain cases, as will be evident shortly.  A Root Mean Squared
Error of the Approximation (RMSEA) of .05 or below is considered good and
above .10 is considered bad.  Table I also reports a 90% confidence interval for
RMSEA.   Lower  bounds  below  .05  are  considered  desirable.   The  Bayes
Information Criteria (BIC) is a statistical-theory based measure that can be used to
determine how much more probable one model  is  than another  to  be the true
model behind a body of data.  A BIC of zero indicates that a model is as probable
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as  the  saturation  model,  which  is  a  model  that  simply  stipulates  that  every
measure is correlated with every other measure.  Such a model perfectly fits the
covariance matrix of the data but requires many parameters.  A BIC below zero
indicates  a model  that  is  more probable than the theory-free saturation  model.
Hoelter's N indicates the sample size below which the researcher could accept the
hypothesis  that  the  theoretical  model  adequately  explains  all  the  observed
covariances  of the variables.   Beyond a certain size sample,  this  hypothesis  is
almost  always  rejected  because  of  small  and usually  meaningless  divergences
from the theoretical model.  A Hoelter's N of 200 or above is considered good.
Table  I  shows  that  a  single  factor  explanation  of  stealth  beliefs  does  not
adequately fit the data according to the more theoretically-driven indicators, while
a two factor model fits well.  Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) simply assume the
unidimensionality of stealth beliefs.  One factor captures a dislike of discussion
and  compromise  (henceforth  "stealth  beliefs  #1—no  debate"),  and  the  other
captures  a  belief  that  elites  should  rule  (henceforth  "stealth  beliefs  #2—elite
rule").   Confirmatory  analysis  shows the  correlation  of  these  two factors  is  a
substantial .68.  Because of the high correlation, the two components of stealth
beliefs may simply be variations of a common second-order factor.   If so, the
subscales  of  stealth  beliefs  need  to  be  examined  for  differences  in  their
relationships to other variables.  Where differences do not emerge, they can be
collapsed.
Rows 4 to 9 of Table I show that a single factor and, in the cases of vertical
collectivism and social empathy, two factors adequately explain the relationships
among indicators for each of these question scales, analyzed individually.  Each of
these models meets all criteria for GFI through Hoelter's N.  Vertical collectivism
loads on two factors that appear to capture willingness to make sacrifices for the
group (henceforth "vertical collectivism #1—sacrifice"), while the other captures
feelings of duty to the group ("vertical collectivism #2—duty").  Social empathy
consists of two related factors, one of which involves respondents expressing the
belief that they generally take into account many points of view in thinking about
political  issues  ("social  empathy  #1—many  views"),  while  the  other  involves
questions that specifically ask if the respondent takes into account the views of
people in different classes and racial groups ("social empathy #2—class and race).
RWA is not included in the single factor models because its confirmatory model
would not converge.  False Consensus is also not included because it has too few
variables for a standalone model.
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Table I.  Confirmatory Factor Analyses of Authoritarian Stealth Democracy
Model Variables
Model
GFI AGFI RMSEA (90%
CI)
BIC Hoelter's
N
Stlth, 1 Factor .98 .90 .138 (.092,.190) 8.14 144
Stlth, 2 Factors .99 .97 .057 (0, .14) -4.86 759
Verticl Collecta .99 .97 .055 (.028,.084) -43.30 399
Social Domin. .99 .99 .018 (0, .115) -6.55 1842
Naïve Realism .99 .98 .039 (0, .069) -50.18 591
Politicl Empthya .98 .96 .050 (.031,.070) -101.77 374
Need Cognition .99 .96 .057 (.030,.085) -42.26 386
Need Structure .99 .96 .070 (.038,.105) -21.04 335
All Factors .89 .87 .040 (.037,.044) -6185.60 316
Plus 2nd Order .86 .84 .046 (NA, NA) -6327.90 274
Notes:  GFI=Goodness of Fit Index; AGFI=Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index; 
RMSEA=Root Mean Squared Error of the Approximation; BIC=Bayes Information 
Criteria.  All Factors is a comprehensive model of all the factors other than stealth beliefs.
This model includes RWA and False Consensus.  Plus 2nd Order is the same 
comprehensive model but with a second-order factor, the “authoritarian constellation,” 
that explains the covariances of all other factors.  A standalone RWA model does not 
converge, and False Consensus has only two variables—insufficient for a standalone 
model.  Analyses were conducted in the R statistical package “sem.”
a Two-factor model.
The "All Factors" row tests a comprehensive model in which all factors other than
stealth beliefs are included.  All Factors includes False Consensus and RWA.  The
GFI and AGFI for this model appear low, but this is an artifact of the model—
particularly an unusually large number of variables.  As the number of variables
increases,  GFI  and  AGFI  decrease  because  of  an  accumulation  of  differences
between actual and model-predicted variances and covariances.  RMSEA, BIC,
and Hoelter's N indicate the model fits the data exceedingly well.  The BIC score
suggests  the  model  is  vastly  more  probable,  under  Bayesian  theory,  than  the
saturation model.  The proposed factor structure thus adequately explains the data.
Additional factors are unneeded and variables group together in coherent factors.
All factor loadings,  of which there are 43, are highly significant,  with median
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absolute z-score of 11.43 and a minimum absolute z-score of 2.8 (p=.005) and the
next lowest absolute z-score of 3.48 (p<.001).  In addition, the model shows that
all the factors are statistically different from each other.  Likelihood ratio tests
checking whether the factor correlations equal one reject this possibility with  χ2
values all exceeding 11.6 for 1 d.f. (p=.0007).
Existence of an Authoritarian Constellation Second-Order Factor
The  final  row  of  Table  I  helps  establish  the  existence  of  a  second-order
authoritarian constellation factor.  In theory, the authoritarian constellation is the
common factor that explains the covariations of all the other factors.  The "Plus
2nd Order" model tests precisely this.  It is the All Factors model plus a second-
order  factor that  explains  all  covariations  among the eleven first-order factors.
This model replaces 54 parameters that permit free covariation among the factors
with  11  parameters  that  only  allow  covariation  between  the  second-level
authoritarian constellation factor and each first-order factor.  Adequate model fit
would  indicate  that  these  11  covariations  with  an  underlying  authoritarian
constellation factor adequately explain the 'observed' 54 covariations of first-order
factors.  That is, the factors covary with each other by virtue of their common
relationship with the authoritarian constellation factor.  The model could very well
turn out not to fit properly.  
Though the model  fits  mildly  less  well  than  the All  Factors  model,  it  readily
passes the RMSEA, BIC, and Hoelter's N criteria.  Indeed, BIC gives the model a
strong vote of confidence, indicating that it is much more likely (7.9*1030 times
more probable according to Bayes factors) to be the correct model than the All
Factors model.  The results support the view that all the observed covariances of
variables across factors can be explained by the factors' relationship to a single
underlying  factor.   The hypothesis  of an underlying  authoritarian  constellation
factor proves very helpful in explaining the data.  All  factor loadings between
first-  and second-order factors have z-scores of at  least 4.38 (p<.00001).   The
loadings,  given how the model is designed, are roughly similar  to correlations
between each first-order factor and the second-order factor.  The mean loading
is .56 and median is .5, with an observed range of .31 to .87.
For  subsequent  analyses,  observed  variables  were  combined  into  scales  to
measure the factors identified using factor scores regressions.  The All Factors
model was used to determine the weights of most variables.  To avoid positivity
bias  (response acquiescence),  positively  and negatively  worded questions were
each  given  the  same cumulative  weight—each  set  affected  the  derived  scales
equally.  Plus 2nd Order determined the weights for a authoritarian constellation
scale  that  is  formed  from  an  average  of  all  variables  for  the  eleven  scales.
35
Muhlberger: Stealth Democracy: Authoritarianism and Democratic Deliberation
Weights for Stealth Beliefs were determined by a standalone model to insure no
transfer of information between the dependent and independent variables.
Convergent and Divergent Validity
The analyses in the last section confirm the construct validity of the measures by
showing  that  they  cluster  together  in  the  expected  factors  and  that  just  these
factors are needed to explain all observed covariations of the constituent variables.
Table 1, however, does not clarify whether the factors covary with each other in
the  expected  direction  and  whether  they  covary  significantly,  as  would  be
expected from the authoritarian stealth democracy thesis.  Table II addresses these
issues  by  showing  the  observed  correlations  between  the  scales  formed  from
weighted  averages  of  the  variables,  as  discussed above.   If  correlations  prove
significant and in the correct direction, this would help affirm the convergent and
divergent validity of the scales.
Table II shows a pattern of significant correlations that is remarkably consistent
with  expectations  from  the  authoritarian  stealth  democracy  thesis.   The
correlations between the authoritarian constellation scale and all the other scales is
always highly significant and in the expected direction.  Between the remaining
first-order  variables  there  are  91  correlations,  80% are  significant  and  in  the
expected direction.  An additional 8% are in the expected direction and show a
statistical trend.  Of the remaining correlations, only two are significant and in an
unexpected direction.  These are the correlations between Vertical Collectivism #2
(Duty) and both Social Empathy #1 and #2 (many views, class and race), which
are  significantly  positive.   Though  not  in  the  expected  direction,  these
relationships make sense—people who wish to fulfill duties to their group may
need to be sensitive to group needs, hence high in social empathy.  Alternatively,
someone  who  feels  duty  bound  may  for  consistency  reasons  be  inclined  to
perceive themselves as sensitive to group needs, even if they are not.  The actual
sensitivity of duty-oriented vertical collectivists can be questioned given that they
are  significantly  more  likely  to  believe  in  a  false  consensus,  have a  need for
structure, and have a low need for cognition (Table II).
Table II supports the single authoritarian constellation factor in another way.  The
authoritarian constellation scale (Auth Const.) is most powerfully related to right-
wing  authoritarianism  (RWA)  and  need  for  cognition  (NFC),  with  absolute
correlations  of about .75.   If  the authoritarian  constellation factor  explains  the
observed correlations among the variables, then RWA and NFC, which correlate
most powerfully with the authoritarian constellation, should have more powerful
correlations  with  other  variables  than  these  variables  have among  themselves.
Indeed, the table shows that RWA and NFC on average have correlations with
other variables that are 64% larger than these variables have among themselves.
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This supports the earlier stipulation that research on RWA and its correlates helps
support the authoritarian stealth democracy thesis.
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Table II.  Correlations Between Variables in the Parochial Citizen Model
1.AC 2.SB1 3.SB2 4.VC1 5.VC2 6.RWA 7.SDO 8.FC 9.EC 10.NR 11.SE1 12.SE2 13.NfC 14.NfS
1.Auth Const.
1.0 .46*** .41*** .38*** .41*** .72*** .49*** .49*** .25*** .21*** -.28*** -.29*** -.77*** .64***
2. Stealth #1
.46*** 1.0 .44*** .18*** .24*** .40*** .09* .35*** .17*** .20*** -.08* -.03 -.29*** .24***
3. Stealth #2
.41*** .44*** 1.0 .22*** .23*** .33*** .26*** .22*** .21*** .15*** -.07†† -.11** -.25*** .16***
4. VC #1
.38*** .18*** .22*** 1.0 .35*** .23*** .17*** .15*** .07†† .10** -.02 -.03 -.20*** .13**
5. VC #2
.41*** .24*** .23*** .35*** 1.0 .38*** .07†† .19*** -.02 -.02 .20*** .19*** -.14*** .17***
6. RWA
.72*** .40*** .33*** .23*** .38*** 1.0 .32*** .32*** .17*** .02 -.05† -.13** -.40*** .32***
7. SDO
.49*** .09* .26*** .17*** .07†† .32*** 1.0 .06†† .12** .06†† -.19*** -.19*** -.32*** .17***
8.False Cons
.49*** .35*** .22*** .15*** .19*** .32*** .06†† 1.0 .08* .12** .06 .003 -.30*** .22***
9.Exp.Confl
.25*** .17*** .21*** .07†† -.02 .17*** .12** .08* 1.0 .14*** -.10** -.05† -.12** .20***
10. Naive R
.21*** .20*** .15*** .10** -.02 .02 .06†† .12** .14*** 1.0 -.22*** -.04 -.13*** .20***
11.Empthy1
-.28*** -.08* -.07†† -.02 .20*** -.05† -.19*** .06 -.10** -.22*** 1.0 .57*** .29*** -.24***
12.Empthy2
-.29*** -.03 -.11** -.03 .19*** -.13** -.19*** .003 -.05† -.04 .57*** 1.0 .32*** -.15***
13. NFC
-.77*** -.29*** -.25*** -.20*** -.14*** -.40*** -.32*** -.30*** -.12** -.13*** .29*** .32*** 1.0 -.46***
14.  NFS
.64*** .24*** .16*** .13** .17*** .32*** .17*** .22*** .20*** .20*** -.24*** -.15*** -.46*** 1.0
***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05; ††=p<.10; †=p<.15; All correlations are one-sided when in the expected direction.  N varies from 555 to 568.
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